AVERROES (Abu ‘l Walid Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Rusd)—the most famous Arab philosopher, physician, and jurist, b. 1126 in Cordoba, d. 1198 in Marakesh.
The family of Banu Rusd was problem Moslem of Spanish descent. None of the biographers, historians, or members of the family made any mention of Arab descent. The philosopher’s grandfather, Abu-l-Walid Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Rusd, called al-Gidd (“grandfather”) was a well-known lawyer and the chief kadi (judge) of Cordoba. Averroes’ father, Abu-l-Qasim Ahmad (1094–1168) also was chief kadi.
Ibn Tufayl was probably Averroes’ teacher, and certainly was his friend. With the help of Ibn Tufayl, Averroes was accepted into the court of the Caliph of the Almohad dynasty where he held disputations with the Caliph on scientific topics. Consequently he was named chief kadi of Seville (1169), chief physician of the court and kadi of Cordoba (1182). The Caliph’s successor Abu Yusufa Ya’quba al-Mansura (1184) confirmed these titles. As judge of Seville, Averroes made many trips to Cordoba where he had his own library, and to Marrakesh.
In 1195, Abu Yusuf Ya‘qub al- Mansur defeated Alphonse VIII of Castille in a battle near Alarcos. A few months later Averroes was put on trial, which concluded with the condemnation of his writings and his banishment to Lucena for over a year. The text of the judgment of condemnation was revised by Abd Alluh ibn Ayyasa. The accusations raised against Averroes were only a pretext. Besides his philosophical views, historians mention five other real reasons for the charges: (1) Averroes was too close a friend with Abu Yahyà, the ruler of Cordoba and the caliph’s brother, who at the time was probably not highly regarded (the opinion of al-Ansari); (2) Abu Yusuf Ya’qub al-Mansur felt offended when Averroes called him the King of the Berbers, and not the King of two continents (the opinion of Ibn Abi Usaybia and al- Marrakusi); (3) Avicenna regarded as a common superstition a predicated cataclysm that was supposed to take place in Cordoba, and said that pronouncements of this sort concerning the world are absurd, which some interpreted as an indirect attack on the story of the destruction of the people of Ad contained in the Koran (the testimony of al-Ansari); (4) Averroes’ enemies showed the Caliph a text of the philosopher containing the statement that Venus is God (the testimony of al-Marrakusi); (4) Ibn Abi Usaybi adds that the reason for the Caliph’s discontent was the accusation that Averroes and other sages were spending time cultivating philosophy and studying ancient authors rather than performing their religious duties.
From the time of R. Renan, the political aspect of the persecution of Averroes has seemed obvious. The family of Banu Rusd always boasted of its Andalusian origin and Averroes frequently praised his own land and his fellow citizens, regarding Arabs as inferior to Andalusians. According to him, the Andalusians were able to assimilate and integrate the Arabs and Berbers, pass on to them their own virtues and energy, and even to increase their intellectual activity. A critique directed against Islamic society in his paraphrase (Taljis) of Plato’s Republic (1194) may have been one of the reasons for his persecution. In those times, as in later times, criticism of the existing oligarchy was something unimaginable.
In 1198, the Caliph repealed Averroes’s exile and called him to the court in Marrakesh. The reasons cited by al-Mansur confirm the political character of the persecution.
Fifty-four works of Averroes have been preserved. There are six other texts, but there are doubts as to whether they are complete. The authenticity of some parts is also in doubt. Lists of the works of Averroes include twenty-one titles of his writings that have not been preserved in their entirety. From their description we may infer that they were not important texts. The number of works erroneously ascribed to him reaches as many as thirty-five titles. The works that have been preserved concern philosophy, theology, medicine, astronomy, and law. Forty-six of these works are written in Arabic, three in Hebrew translation, and ten in Latin translation.
The most important works are as follows. Kitab al-Daruri fi-l-Mantiq (Elements of logic) contains (1) Al-Majdal (Compendium of the Isagoge); (2) Al-Maqulat (Compendium of the Categories); (3) Al-‘Ibara (Compendium of the Prior Analytics); (5) Al-Burhan (Compendium of the Posterior Analytics); (6) Al-Gadal (Compendium of the Topics); (7) Al-Safsata (Compendium of On Sophistic Refutations); (8) Al-Jitaba (Compendium of Rhetoric); (9) Al-Si‘r (Compendium of the Poetics). Kitab al-gawami‘ al-sugar fi- l-falsafa (Compendium of philosophy) contains (1) Al-Sama‘ al-tabii ‘i (Compendium of the Physics); (2) Al-Sama‘ wa-l-‘alam (Compendium of On heaven and earth); (3) Al-Kawn wa-l-fasad (Compendium of On Generation and Corruption); (4) Al-Atar al-‘ulwiya (Compendium of the Meteorology); (5) Al-Nafs (Compendium of On the Soul); (6) Ma ba‘d al-tabi‘a (Compendium of the Metaphysics). Kitab al- hayawan (Book about animals) contains: (1) Al-A‘da al-hayawan (On the parts of animals); (2) Al-Kawn al-hayawan (On the generation of animals); (3) Gawami‘ [kutub] al-hiss wa-l- mahsus, [wa-Fi-l-tafahus ‘an asbab tul al-‘amr wa-qasrihi] (Compendium of the four books of the Parva Naturalia); and (5) Taljis k. al-Majdal (Paraphrase of the Isagoge). The Taljis k. al-Mantiq (Paraphrase of the logical books) contains: (1) Al- Maqulat (Paraphrase of the Categories); (2) Al-‘Ibara (Paraphrase of the Hermeutics); (3) Al-Qiyas (Paraphrase of the Prior Analytics); (4) Al-Burhan (Paraphrase of the Posterior Analytics); (5) Al-Gadal (Paraphrase of the Topics); (6) Al-Safsata (Paraphrase of On Sophistic Refutations); (7) Al-Jitaba (Paraphrase of the Rhetoric); (8) Al- Si‘r (Paraphrase of the Poetics). Taljis k. al-Sama‘ al-tabi’i (Paraphrase of the Physics. Taljis k. al-Sama wa-l- ‘alam (Paraphrase of On Heaven and Earth). Taljis k. al-Kawn wa-l-fasad (Paraphrase of On Generation and Corruption). Taljis k. al-Atar al-‘ulwiya (Paraphrase of the Meteorology). Taljis k-al- Nafs (Paraphrase of On the Soul). Taljis k. al-Ajlaq (Paraphrase of the Nichomachean Ethics). Taljis k. al-Siyasat Aflatun (Paraphrase of Plato’s Republic). Tafsir k. al-Burhan (Litteral commentary on the Posterior Analytics). Tafsir k. al-Sama’ al- tabi‘i (to the Physics). Tafsir k. al Sama’ wa-l-‘alam (to On Heaven and Earth). Tafsir k. al-Nafs (to On the Soul). Tafsir k. Ma ba‘d al-tabi‘a (to the Metaphysics). Sarh maqalat al-Iskander fi-l- ‘aql (Commentary on Alexander of Aphrodisia’s On the Intellect). Sarh k. Tamistiws (to Themistius). Tahafut al-Tahafut al-falasifa li-l- Gazzali (Refutation of Algazali’s Refutation of the Philosophers). Maqala fi gawhar al-falak (On the substance of the world). Fasl al-maqal fi ma bayn al- agari‘a wa-l-hikma min al-ittisal (Final treatise on the agreement of revelation with wisdom). Kasf ‘an manahig al- adilla fi aqa’ id al-milla (The showing of ways that lead to the justification of the truths of faith). Damima li-mas’ alat al-’ilm al-qadim (Letter on knowledge about God). Paraphrase to Galen’s medicine. Sarh Urguzat Ibn Sina fi-l-tibb (Commentary on Avicenna’s medical Urguz). K. al-Kulliyat fi-l-tibb (Medical Manual). Mujtasar al-Magisti (Summary of the Almagests).
UNDERSTANDING OF PHILOSOPHY. Averroes’s philosophical formation was typical for “falsafa” (Arab philosophy), in which Aristotle’s philosophy was the obligatory starting point. According to Averroes, the Greek philosopher should be read directly. This leads to the key points of Aristotelian thought: (1) the physical concept of the cosmos, with the conception of the unmoved mover; (2) the active, actual, and substantial character of “ousia”; (3) the positive treatment of matter; (4) the radical understanding of philosophy as the highest form of human wisdom that directs man’s moral conduct in its individual and social dimension. In this perspective we should look at Averroes’s profound and repeated lectures on the Corpus aristotelicum arabum and his harsh criticism of Avicenna’s interpretation.
With the exception of the tafsirat, Averroes’s writings on Aristotle’s works are not commentaries in the strict sense. (1) They are primarily lectures on Greek philosophy as human wisdom that is independent of religious knowledge and the empirical-practical skills proper to industry and art. (2) His presentation of Aristotle’s thought, being in fact an experience of philosophical wisdom, possesses an intentional identity, but not always a material identity, with Aristotle’s doctrine. Where there is a material identity, it is due to the intentional identity. (3) Averroes’ interpretation marks an important turn in the cosmological vision of Islamic scholasticism, which hindered its formal continuation within Moslem culture.
Averroes was absolutely certain of that Aristotelian wisdom had a radical significance. This certainty was already present in his first writings: (1) in Gawami‘, an introduction to the Aristotelian type of philosophy; (2) the Taljisat constitute a more extensive and more detailed way of presenting philosophy—their scope is greater than that of Gawami‘—they include almost all the writings of the Corpus aristotelicum arabum, which are sometimes cited almost literally and are preceded by indicators. The literal commentaries (tafsirat, which the Latin commentators called the greater commentaries, are commentaries in the strict sense of the word. Perhaps Averroes took commentaries on medical works as his model rather than the tafsir in Islamic doctrine. His intention to make a detailed lecture is already clear at the beginning where he mentions the name and titles of the author’s works, explains the name or names of each writing, and even analyzes the meaning of the terms.
Averroes accepted the basic views of Aristotelian thought concerning wisdom and the degrees of knowledge, the ancillary role of logic, the character of intellectual knowledge, the universal importance of human knowledge, the fundamental role of substance as a constitutive principle of things, the idea of moral intellectual cognition as that which directs man’s action, and he accepted the idea that the moral life is the highest human happiness. He received Aristotle’s texts according to the axis of his own speculation. At the same time he contrasted what he regarded as Aristotle’s true opinion against the interpretations of Theophrastus, Alexander of Aphrodisia, Porphyry, Themistius, John Philoponus, al-Kindi, al-Farabi, Ibn Baggah, and Avicenna.
Averroes’s critique of Avicenna’s thought is extensive, harsh, profound, and there are no equals to it among medieval thinkers. Averroes shows no contempt or personal animosity toward Ibn Sina, rather Averroes rejects those ideas that could be an expression of compromise with the proper cosmological vision of Islamic theology, a vision expressed in subtle categories of neo-Platonic provenance.
The Meteorology, Kulliyat, and On the Temperaments contain important conclusions from Averroes’s empirical observations. Even Averroes’s embryological studies appear there. According to Averroes, a potentiality exists in the semen that determines the shape of the offspring, its nourishment, and the development of its organs. Another important observation of Averroes concerns the earthquake in Cordoba around the year 1169. Averroes dwelt then in Seville and did not directly witness the event. When he arrived in Cordoba, he heard the rumblings that came from the moved earth, saw the sand scattered by the seismic tremor as well as ash and sand scattered in the vicinity of the city. As for his botanical experiments, there is an interesting text in which Averroes states that if we sow barley and put it in a tube so that it would sprout inside it, both the ear and the root will grow. His students were awed when he showed them the results of his experiments.
The doctrinal wealth of Averroes’s numerous writings gave rise to opposing interpretations concerning his religious attitude. For Averroes, the starting point was an attempt to understand the revealed truth. Our reason’s use of the truths of faith for seeking knowledge should take the form of apodictic proof. The rational cognition of revealed truth cannot be done once only or definitively. A single man would be unable to achieve this knowledge by his own powers, unless it had been revealed to him. No science ever arose in one day, and so we must know the history of thought, and if we find in that history a statement in agreement with the truth, we should accept it.
THE PROBLEM OF THE TWO TRUTHS. Averroes’s texts are so clear that perhaps their very clarity has contributed to the problem of the two truths. It is evident that Averroes wanted to eliminate theological anthropomorphism, yet his understanding of the analogia entis is limited to an Aristotelian paradigm. For this reason, Averroes’ theological conception relies on the necessity of recognizing a hermeneutical equivocity. Hence the Latin Averroists concluded that, according to Averroes, a philosophical statement is true even if it contradicts a revealed truth, but the revealed truth does not thereby lose its theological value. Because Averroes explicitly referred to three religions and criticized Islamic theologians along with the representatives of other religions, he gave a specific character to the disputes of the medieval Latins.
The entire complex dialectic of Averoes concerning the justification of philosophy, its relation to speculative theology, and its basic lack of contradiction with religion, was aimed at providing a rational justification for the necessity and importance of rational knowledge. The starting point here was a radical division of people based on differences in their way and degree of knowing. Wise men, according to Averroes, possess a special degree of knowledge, the highest degree to which humankind can aspire.
Knowledge is possible only because the general principle of causality is universally binding. What allows the formal reality of things to be transformed into the formal reality of human knowledge is the fundamental relation of consubstantiality that exists between the ontological world and the cognitive world—it is always the case that being is cognitively grasped by being. When in a simple apprehension we spontaneously know a substance and accidents, there is no possibility of error—falsehood may appear only when we make a synthetic judgment.
Averroes rejected common opinion and custom as sources of knowledge. He also established ontological foundations for epistemological principles. He took up the problem of knowledge typical of the science of his time. It is knowledge as wisdom or knowledge that is certain. It consists in knowing things such as they are. This becomes possible when the dialectic order follows the ontological order, that is, when it is based on causes. Apart from scientific cognition, there is also approximate or probable cognition, where demonstration is equated with belief, which is proper to rhetoric and poetics.
THE DIVISION OF THE SCIENCES. The ontological foundations of knowledge allow man to strive for universal knowledge, which should be understood in an analogical sense. Human wisdom includes science and art. Both science and art are divided into three classes: (1) theoretical (theory), which aims at knowledge as such; (2) practical, which aims at action; (3) instrumental knowledge, which assists and facilitates speculation or action. Likewise, the arts have a theoretical dimension, an action proper to them which is creative work, and their own tools. In turn, according to the Aristotelian model, the sciences are divided into universal and particular, depending on whether they are concerned with being as such or with the concrete modes of its existence. There are three general sciences: topics, sophistics, and first philosophy. There are two particular sciences: the knowledge of nature, namely physics, and the knowledge of being under its quantitative aspect, namely mathematics.
The basis of this division is the corresponding mode of existence: (1) beings that can really exist only in matter are the object of the science of nature, namely physics; (2) beings that exist in matter but can be studied independently of their connection with matter (which included continuous quantity and discrete quantity) are the object of mathematics; (3) the principles that by their essence exist indpendently of matter are the object of metaphysics. The proper and immediate object of metaphysics includes the final cause and the formal cause. The efficient cause is secondarily and indirectly the object of metaphysics. Insofar as physics directly studies the material and moving cause, metaphysics derives its object from physics. The ultimate causes of all beings coincide, hence this type of reflection must use precise terminology.
Metaphysics is the science that has the most noble object—being as being. Metaphysics must refer to every kind of being and every being in particular, but not in the same way as the particular sciences do. Rather, metaphysics comprehends beings in a general sense. Metaphysics is not a purely abstract science, but a general science, and in this sense it is similar to divine science (revealed theology). Metaphysical speculation strives for divine science, but cannot fully achieve it. This conception of Averroes, although in the hierarchical order it recognizes that metaphysics is superior to physics, directs ontology as a whole to comprehend the ontological aspect of the concrete thing, because in both experience and in practice, knowledge of the world of nature is prior to metaphysical knowledge.
Nature always acts with the help of many causes. Causality as it is really given contains three metaphysical moments: the subject that receives action, the privation of specific form, and the reception of a determined form. The fundamental elements must be: (1) a subject, in keeping with the ancient Greek principle that from nothing, nothing comes; (2) privation (privatio), which is a positive disposition to recieve a concrete form. Each thing is such as it is by reason of its concrete form, but also because of matter, since without matter a form could not be received. Form and matter are the principles of concrete being. The study of prime matter and of the first mover is the task of physics, and physics presupposes a knowledge of general principles. The strong influence of Aristotle led Averroes to the belief that substantial existence is the most characteristic mode of existence.
Matter, which is common to all material beings, has a nature proper to universal being, but if this were the case in a strict sense, matter would have to possess a general form from which its formal unity would come. This would be in contradiction with the fact that although matter is one, it can exist in plurality. This contradiction is only apparent, because it would be a contradiction if matter had always existed in act, but meanwhile as common matter it exists in potency. For matter to be one, the individual differences (al-fusul al-sajsiya) of concrete beings would have to be set aside. This is not the case, since matter exists in act in the real material being. To call it one and common because we think of it together with a common form is to confuse it with a universal.
The elastic and manifold potentiality of matter, and the possibility of many forms existing in potency, guarantee the transformation of various secondary causes of action. The condition that makes these actions possible is the connection of potency and act, which should not be understood in an objective sense, but as a relation. Everything that exists is a whole that is at the same time actual and potential. Therefore in concrete beings we should be know how to distinguish the modality of a given act and a given potency.
The cosmos is conceived as a permanent relation of potentiality and actuality, yet it is not established once and for all but rather it is alive and therefore changing. Physical beings create, as it were, a scale of potentialities and actualities, which extend from pure act to pure potentiality. Everything happens because of one necessary mover, which in a certain sense reduces potentiality and moves beings to a more and more pure actuality. The inclination to increasing actualization raises the being of a physical things to the ontological level of the good.
THE UNDERSTANDING OF GOD. Averroes’ intention of restoring Aristotle’s naturalistic vision by connecting physics with the problem of one first mover can be interpreted as follows. Avicenna abstracts from God the Creator in his approach to Islamic doctrine. Yet in this case, the parallelism of the Commentator with the Philosopher is not completely strict. Aristotle’s great idea, which still influences the history of science, is his clear vision of the unity of the cosmos. Averroes regards this principle of unity as fundamental in the order of being and knowledge. Yet no matter how naturalistic is Averroes’ conception, he says that the unchanging and eternal first mover is God. Let us recall that for the Greeks, to say that God is the self-thinking thought can be understood in various ways. Averroes’ concept of God is that of the God who is absolute and one, in number and in essence.
The concept of God as the first mover who orders the cosmos is explicitly physical. The texts of the Tahafut show another way of knowing God. The way begins from two principles: the necessity of coming-into-existence, and its causal explanation. The physical and metaphysical presuppositions of Averroes’ theory lead to the acceptance of the thesis of God’s oneness, since two efficient causes equal to each other could act against each other, as a result of which the object of such action would be destroyed. Therefore the single God is the single creator of all things in the real and ordered cosmos. The order of the world reflects the oneness of the Creator and the mode of the existence of His knowledge, hence in the case of God we are dealing with eternal knowledge, whereas Averroes’ conception of creation is based on a system of equivocation. God has always willed the possible cosmos which is the cosmos such as it really exists.
Averroes recalls an Aristotelian principle from the Nicomachean Ethics, that order has a necessary character: a city divided is doomed to fall; many centers of power may exist in it, but all must be subject to one superior power. This condition comes from nature. If this is the case in our human world, all the more it must be the case for the whole cosmos.
THE UNDERSTANDING OF MAN. To understand Averroes’ anthropological conception, we should remember the biological inspiration of Aristotle, his master, and Aristotle’s understanding of man as a whole. The methodological context of the Aristotelian understanding of man that Averroes developed is far removed from contemporary ethological and ecological studies, but this is a certain agreement in the sense that man is a microcosm who exists in a continuous relation with the cosmos. These realities condition each other. Averroes develops his understanding of man in accordance with the conception of hylemorphism: the entire human body functions as a global polysystem composed of three independent subsystems—the vegetative, namely the nutritive, the animal, namely the sensory, and the specifically human, namely the cognitive.
By his faculty of rational knowledge, man differs from all other living beings, although certain animals may in a certain way participate in this potentiality. This ability in man is called the cogitative power (vis cogitativa), and in animals it is called the estimative power (vis aestimativa), since it enables knower to distinguish significant contents or intentions in mental images. Therefore Averroes defines it as an ability that distinguishes the intention of a sensible thing from its imaginary form, acting in a unique and concrete way, while abstraction is connected with the function of the intellect.
Averroes follows Aristotle in accepting the moving factor or soul as the perfect principle or entelechy of the whole nature in individual animate beings. Animate beings need something that calls them to life by which they move and can live. In animals these actions result from two principles: active and passive. The active principle acts as form and is the formative element. The passive principle acts as the appetitive element in relation to the form that it is needs and seeks.
THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROCESS OF KNOWLEDGE. Averroes became famous as the great commentator on Aristotle and as the author of an original conception of the human intellect. This conception in a certain way undermines individual personality and responsibility, and also denies the possibility of the human soul’s immortality. Averroes bases his opinion on four presuppositions from Aristotle: (1) the material reality of the physical cosmos; (2) the necessity of sensory knowledge of the concrete thing, since in the human mind there is nothing that was not first in the senses; (3) the principle that nothing comes from potency to act unless because of a being that exists in act; (4) the presupposition that only a being can know a being. For this reason, the forms whereby knowledge is possible do not constitute a world independent of nature and of man, but they exist individually and really in the essences of concrete things, and they exist potentially as universals that can be abstracted from these things. The formal and full mode of knowledge consists in the abstraction of forms. The perception of these forms makes man become what he knows.
Averroes’ chief novelty in relation to Aristotle’s thought, with the presented cognitive process, concerns the unity of the material intellect. Both the intellect in act and the habitual intellect (‘aql bi-l-malaka) are based on the above mentioned material or potential intellect, which is characteristic of man. It is called material by an analogy with prime matter, since like prime matter it can be transformed into all things. The intellect in act is by nature finite and defined. The material intellect cannot be treated as a definite thing, since it is in potency to be all things. Therefore it is neither matter nor form, nor a composition of matter and form. Its essence is the ability to exist in potency to all concepts of general forms in matter.
Knowing is as natural for man as living, taking nourishment, and procreating. The apex of knowledge is theoretical knowledge, and the truth is the end of human action. When a man departs from the right road, which is intellectual knowledge, the result is the same is when he ignores the laws of nature. He becomes a monster, which expresses itself in ethical life in depravity. In ethics and in political philosophy, Averoes emphasizes the holistic character of man’s perfection.
THE UNDERSTANDING OF SOCIETY. The ethical ideal of attaining the whole perfection of the person requires an adequate social structure as its necessary basis. In this case as well, Averroes applies the doctrine of potency and act. He states in his striving for perfection man needs to collaborate with others who possess perfection in act. Therefore the moral order of the social world is parallel to the order of the cosmic universe. Yet the order that constitutes the sphere of freedom is not based on a simple power such as comes from the natural power of the existing Intelligences that direct the cosmos. Only beyond these boundaries can one desire to become perfect and noble. Therefore freedom is man’s central privilege and the sign of his imperfection, not the sign of the glory of his nature.
Although Aristotle’s Politics was not available to Islamic thought, Averroes recreated the foundations of Aristotle’s doctrine from the Nicomachean Ethics, the Metaphysics, and Rhetoric. He also interpreted the second and ninth book of Plato’s Republic. Man’s perfection as a whole requires the development of individual differences. If each and every individual was destined to everything, nature would be working in vain, which Averroes thought to be absurd. Of course, a man may first be a speaker, then a poet, and even a philosopher. However, the normal state of affairs is that people use the help of others in order to develop their perfections, as happens in the arts, where some arts are preparations for others.
Averroes gives evidence of his profound realism when he states that in society’s present state the ethical ideal is unattainable for most people. Hence he looks to the Aristotelian theory of the art of persuasion which he learned from the Rhetoric. For many people who are unable to attain the ideal of free intellectual persuasion, this order must be realized by the indirect ideal of eudaimonia, which consists in the realization of many concrete goods such as the right to an honest life, the right to start a family, to possess friends, to enjoy good health, to live in relative prosperity, etc. The enjoyment of these goods determines honesty, and honesty makes the life of most people possible and honest. It makes of them the subjects of public praises and is the basis of ethical education.
Averroes gives to society, because of the pedagogical role of political authority, the structure of a gigantic educational whole. Society is a body composed of unified elements that occupy a middle position between strictly natural bodies and artificial bodies. Society as a body constitutes an essential unity because it is created by unified elements. These elements are something more than mere parts of the whole. Society is a condition that perfects the citizen in his concrete individual perfection, within the framework of universal order. Society is a school, and political authority is a teacher.
Published works by Averroes include the following: Philosophie und Theologie von Averroes (ed. M. J. Müller, M 1875, repr. Osnabrück 1974); Die Epitome der Metaphysik des Averroes (ed. S. van den Bergh, Lei 1924, repr. 1970); A. C. Compendia lib. Aristotelis qui Parva naturalia vocantur (ed. A. L. Shields, H. Blumberg, C 1949); A. C. Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima (ed. F. Stuart Crawford, C 1953); A. Tahafut al- Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence) (ed. S. van den Bergh, I–II, Lo 1954, repr. 1969); Averroes’s Commentary on Plato’s Republic (ed. E. Rosenthal, C 1956, repr. 1966, 1969); On the Harmony of Religions and Philosophy (ed. G. F. Hourani, Lo 1961, repr. 1976); A. Com. Med. in Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Categorias (ed. H. A. Davidson, I–II, Be, Los Angeles 1969); A., Three Short Com. on Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione (ed. C. Butterworth, Pri 1983); Das Kapital über das Begehren aus dem mit. Kom. des A. zur Schrift über die Seele (A 1985); A. De substantia orbis (ed. A. Hyman, C 1986); La psicologia de A., Com. al. lib. sobre el alma de Aristoteles (ed. S. Gomez Nogales, Ma 1987); A., Epitome in Physicorum libros (ed. J. Puig Muntada, Ma 1987); La medicina de A.: comentarios a Galeno (ed. M. C. Vazquez de Benito, Sal 1987); A. Kulliyat (ed. C. Alvarez, I–II, Ma, Granada 1988).
E. Renan, A. et l’averroîsme, P 1852; L. Gauthier, La théorie d’ibn Rochd (A.) sur les rapports de la religion et de la philosophie, P 1909; M. Horten, Die Metaphysik des A., Hl 1912, repr. 1960; idem, Die Hauptlehren des A. nach seines Schrift: Die Widerlegung des Gazali, Bo 1913; S. Nirenstein, The Problem of the Existence of God in A., Ph 1924; M. Alonso, Teologia de A., Ma 1947; L. Gauthier, Ibn Rochd (A.), P 1948; A. W. Khan, Ibn Rushd, Lahore 1956; M. Fajri, Islamic Occasionalism and its Critique by Averroes, Lo 1958; R. de Mendizabal, A., un andaluz para Europa, Ma 1971; A. V. Sagadeev, Ibn Rusd, A., Moscow 1973; E. Torre, A. y la ciencia médica. La doctrina anatomo-funcional del Colliget, Ma 1974; Multiple A., 8e Centenaire de la naissance d’Averoès, P 1978; M. Qasim, Théorie de la connaissance d’après A., Argel 1978; B. S. Kogan, A. and the Metaphysics of Causation, Albany 1985; M. Cruz Hernández, A. Exposición de la Republica de Platón, Ma 1986; 19964; Oliver, A. and His Philosophy, NY 1988; P. W. Rosemann, A.: A Cataloque of Editions and Scholarly Writings from 1821 Onwards, Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 30 (1988), 153–221; Al encuentro de A., Ma 1993; M. Cruz Hernández, Abu-l-Walid Ibn Rusd, A.: vida, obra, pensamiento, influencia, Cordoba 1997.
Miguel Cruz Hernandez